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ABSTRACT
International trade policy in the United States prior to 1934 was
determined by a Congress that represented the interests of diverse and
changing domestic production. Southern agriculture pursued free trade
policies to enable access to foreign markets for their goods, while Northern
industry sought protection against imports that would stymie their nascent
development. By 1934, it became clear that trade policy needed to be
streamlined and accelerated to address the rapidly changing trade landscape.
In order to stave off some of the destruction of the Great Depression,
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Congress temporarily delegated its power to regulate trade to the President
to manage international trade policy. Since that first delegation, Presidents
capitalized on this delegation to pursue a policy of free trade, leading to
phenomenal domestic economic growth, vast expansion of global trade, and
a more peaceful world. This policy has been turned on its head since 2018
when the Trump Administration began using this delegated authority not in
the pursuit of free trade and democracy, but rather to solicit political support
from certain domestic industries and to punish uncooperative countries.
Much of this new strategy to trade is rooted in the national security exception
present in U.S. trade law.
In this paper, I argue that the national security exception created by the
1962 Trade Expansion Act during the Cold War is meant to be
extraordinarily narrow and rarely used, and that any broad application of this
exception would likely compromise the world trade system altogether. I
suggest that Congress, where trade policy power lies, should reassert control
over trade policy and guide the President’s hand in the pursuit of beneficial
economic goals for the United States as a whole.
I will begin this paper with a historical exploration of trade policy
through the lens of protective tariffs. I will then emphasize the development
of the national security exception in domestic trade law, paying special
attention to the most recent iteration of this exception being applied today. I
will then compare this national security exception in domestic law to the
essential security exception found in international trade law to better
understand its meaning and application on a global scale. Finally, I will
review domestic caselaw and legislation related to the delegation of trade
policymaking authority to the President and argue how this power is being
abused by the TrumpAdministration and what should be done to change that.
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the Executive branch of government is responsible
for, among other things, foreign affairs, including treaty negotiation and
foreign policymaking.1 The Legislature is responsible for, among other
things, the regulation of interstate and international commerce.2 The
nondelegation doctrine, paramount to the concept of separation of powers,
restricts the Legislature from delegating its lawmaking power to the
1. U.S. Const. art. II; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 319 (1936) (concluding that the President is the voice of the nation in front of other
nations).
2. SeeU.S. Const. art. I § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .”).
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policymaking Executive.3 This limited the growth of the administrative state
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, over
time, as the United States expanded and diversified and became a more
advanced and complex economy, it became apparent that some delegation of
power to the law enforcement and public policy head of the government
would be necessary.4 By 1934, in the midst of the progressive New Deal
program, Congress made the first outright delegation of their trade authority
to the President, beginning the ongoing fight over who is Constitutionally
authorized to regulate commerce.5
That 1934 Act, known as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
(RTAA), was highly controversial when it was enacted. One congressional
representative from New York opined that it was “an outright betrayal of our
representative form of government [that] amounts to an open admission by
Congress that . . . it is now incompetent and unfit to legislate properly,
intelligently and in the public interest.”6 It was seen as a “radical” change in
commercial policy. That Act, passed in the midst of the Great Depression
and upon the aggressive lobbying of President Roosevelt and his Secretary
of State, Cordell Hull, was an attempt to give the President a stronger hand
in using trade policy to improve the domestic economic environment by
opening the door to free trade.
The RTAA, which I discuss in more detail later, paved the way for a
number of subsequent trade acts, many of which expanded the President’s
authority to conduct trade policy through the use of trade agreements and
tariff adjustments. Those delegations of power were carefully constructed
so as to limit the President’s actions by enabling him to moderate, but not to
legislate trade policy. But the vagueness in these delegations has left a great
deal of interpretive power in the hands of the Executive, raising concerns
about improper delegation by Congress and abuse of power by the Executive.
Those concerns rarely materialized into legal inquiries or actions,
principally because the President tended to use the delegated trade authority
to pursue the goals of trade liberalization and the promotion of U.S. exports,
3. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (noting that the legislative branch is vested with “all
legislative powers,” which has been interpreted to mean that those powers may not be
delegated away). But see, Keith E. Whittington and Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Non-
delegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (2017) (contending that the non-
delegation doctrine never fully constrained the ability of Congress to delegate its power to the
President).
4. SeeWhittington and Iuliano, supra note 3 at 384–86 (“[C]ontemporaries understood
that the demise of the nondelegation doctrine was part and parcel of the reconstruction of the
constitutional order that was wrought by the New Deal.”).
5. Id. at 385 (discussing the New Deal revolution in delegated authority to enact social
programs).
6. 78 CONG. REC. 5,613 (1934).
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which have become an increasingly essential part of the U.S. economy.7
That changed in 2018, when the Trump Administration decided to utilize
their delegated trade power under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to
impose worldwide tariffs on steel and aluminum, finding that those “articles
are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United
States.”8 This action prompted a number of observers to question the basis
for utilizing national security as a reason to restrict worldwide imports.9
In this short paper, I argue that the congressional delegation of trade
authority to the Executive to restrict trade on the basis of national security,
as well as the Trump Administration’s broad interpretation of that authority,
violate the non-delegation doctrine and likely put the United States in
violation of its commitments under world trade rules. This assertion will be
answered through two inquiries: first, did the congressional delegation of
power to the Executive to impose tariffs on the basis of national security
violate the intelligible principle of the non-delegation doctrine? And second,
is the President’s broad interpretation of the national security exception
found in section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 justifiable and
defensible?
To answer these questions, I will first explain what the section 232
tariffs are and the authority from which they emanate. I will then trace the
history of the delegated trade authority to identify the origins of the national
security exception, including a jaunt through the battles over trade authority
from the nineteenth century through today. I then provide a comparative
examination of the equivalent authority within theWorld Trade Organization
(WTO) and how that entity is addressing new defenses by other countries on
national security grounds. And finally, I will work through recent trends in
7. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. TRADE TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1–2
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45420.pdf [https://perma.cc/GF4S-JPHQ] (explaining
that the U.S. accounted for approximately 25% of world trade in 2018); See also BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, HOW THE U.S. ECONOMY BENEFITS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE &
DEVELOPMENT (2015), https://tradepartnership.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/US_State_
Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG6Z-DJ2P] (discussing the more than $2 trillion in goods and
services exports from the United States in 2013).
8. Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (March 15, 2018) (applying worldwide
tariffs on steel and aluminum imports on the basis of national security).
9. See, e.g., Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, CATO INST., CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX: THE
GROWINGABUSE OF THENATIONAL SECURITY RATIONALE FOR RESTRICTING TRADE, 2 (2019)
(describing the domestic and international concerns over the invocation of Section 232 to
justify steel and aluminum tariffs). But seeHenry Fernandez, Trump tariffs are about national
security: Peter Navarro, Fox Bus., (May 31, 2018) (interviewingWhite House National Trade
Council Director Peter Navarro, who said, “This particular action on steel and aluminum is
not about unfair trade practices. It’s about national security . . . without an aluminum steel
industry, we don’t have a country.”).
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the courts and legislature to curtail or modify this authority, and I will assess
their likelihood of success. I begin with a brief examination of the section
232 tariffs for context.
THE SECTION 232 TARIFFS
President Trump imposed worldwide tariffs on steel and aluminum
imports into the United States on March 8, 2018.10 The tariffs were
authorized by the power vested in the President through the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962.11 Tariff levels were set at 25% for steel and 10% for aluminum,
regardless of the origin. Because this was a congressionally delegated
power, the President was not required to seek approval from, only
notification of, Congress for this action.12
The President could have relied upon myriad legal justifications that
exist within U.S. law that have been used frequently in the past to protect
industries such as steel. These include section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974,
which allows import restrictions to prevent a surge of foreign imports that
threaten to cause serious injury to a U.S. industry.13 He could also have relied
upon section 301 of that statute, which allows import restrictions to counter
unfair trade practices by foreign countries, such as market access
restrictions.14 Rather, the Administration chose to rely upon a provision that
had previously been used twenty-seven times prior to 2017, with a positive
finding of threat in only nine of those investigations.15 Seven investigations
have been initiated since 2017, with five finding threats, and three ongoing
10. Proclamation No. 9705, supra note 8; Proclamation No. 9711, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,361
(March 22, 2018) (“In the exercise of these authorities, I have decided to adjust the imports
of steel articles by imposing a 25 percent ad valorem tariff on steel articles, as defined below,
imported from all countries except Canada and Mexico.”).
11. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794 § 232(b), 76. Stat. 877 (“[The
President] shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the
imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not so threaten to impair
the national security.”); 19 U.S.C. § 1862 is the codified form of Pub. L. No. 87-794 § 232.
12. See § 232(d), 76 Stat. at 877 (“A report shall be made and published upon the
disposition of each request, application, or motion under subsection (b).”
13. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 § 201(a)(1), 88 Stat. 2011 (“A petition
for eligibility for import relief for the purpose of facilitating orderly adjustment to import
competition may be filed with the International Trade Commission . . . by an entity, including
a trade association, firm, certified or recognized union, or group of workers, which is
representative of an industry.”).
14. See id. at § 301(a) (listing a variety of improper foreign trade measures that were
grounds for Presidential action).
15. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS 58–61 app. B (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45249.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5
E4-3HMD].
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as of the publication of this article.16
As brief background, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was enacted in
the midst of the Cold War, when national security threats were significant
concerns for the United States.17 The Act delegated some congressional
trade power to the executive in cases involving threats to national security,
broadly defined. Section 232 of that Act is the subject of discussion here, as
it was the basis for recent actions by the Trump Administration raising
concerns about abuse of the delegated powers.18
Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended by the
Trade Act of 1974,19 stipulates that when an “article is being imported into
the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security,” [the President is authorized to] “take
such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports
of [the] article and its derivatives so that . . . imports [of the article] will not
threaten to impair the national security.”20
The Act requires the Secretary of Commerce to commence an
investigation under section 232 upon the request of any federal agency or
interested party (or of their own will).21 That investigation is intended to
determine whether the targeted product “is being imported into the United
States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to
impair”22 U.S national security.23 Though it is not clear precisely what
congress meant by “national security” when they enacted this legislation, the
Act contains certain factors that need to be considered in investigating a
national security threat under the Act, including:
• domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements;
• domestic capacity;
• the availability of human resources and supplies essential to the
national defense; and,
• potential unemployment, loss of skills or investment, or decline
in government revenues resulting from displacement of any
16. Id.
17. Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962).
18. Id. at § 232.
19. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978.
20. § 232(b), 76 Stat. 877.
21. See id. (“Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of
an interested party, or upon his ownmotion, the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning
. . . shall immediately make an appropriate investigation . . . .”).
22. Id.
23. See CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY OVER TRADE: IMPOSING TARIFFS ANDDUTIES, 2–3 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R44707.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JS7-6ELZ].
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domestic products by excessive imports.24
The Secretary of Commerce must produce a report for the President
within 270 days of the initiation of the investigation to allow the President
to determine which action to take, if any. The President may use trade
restrictions, such as import tariffs, to mitigate the threat, or may choose other
means or no action at all. In any case, the President must report to congress
on actions taken within 30 days and must publish a summary of the action in
the Federal Register for public view.25
Since its passage, the Act has been used to conduct thirty–one
investigations (through 2019) to determine whether an import poses a risk to
the national security of the United States. In more than half of these cases,
the Department of Commerce did not find that the target imports posed a
threat to national security. In the remaining cases in which they did identify
a threat, the President took action in just over half. Most of the cases
involving section 232 prior to the Trump Administration have involved
petroleum or minerals.26 As of early 2020, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection has collected over $9 billion in tariff revenue from goods
restricted by section 232 since 2018.27 To better understand how the national
security exception came to be relied upon as a tool to protect domestic
producers at the expense of liberal world trade, we must take a trip back in
time.
A. Tariffs and Public Policy
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution designates in no uncertain
terms the power over international trade to the U.S. Congress. It says that
Congress shall have the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States,”28 and “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”29
This clearly leaves up to Congress the decision on whether to impose tariffs
24. § 232(c), 76 Stat. 877.
25. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (“By no later than the date that is 30 days after the date on
which the President makes any determinations under paragraph (1), the President shall submit
to the Congress a written statement of the reasons why the President has decided to take
action, or refused to take action, under paragraph (1).”).
26. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV. supra note 15, at 58–61 app. B. (identifying 8 cases of
oil or petroleum and 12 cases involving steel and minerals).
27. Id. at 15 (“As of August 12, 2020, two full years since the Section 232 tariffs took
effect, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) assessed $7.3 billion in steel tariffs and
$2.2 billion in aluminum tariffs.”).
28. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
29. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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on imported goods, and if so, at what rate. And this is what Congress had
done exclusively prior to the 1930s.30 One of the mechanisms frequently
used to regulate international trade is the application or removal of tariffs, a
power undoubtedly in the hands of Congress, but since 1934, delegated to
the President through the trade acts discussed below.31
Yet even before we reach the relevant trade acts, we must highlight the
Constitutional designation of related powers. The President plays a role in
international trade and policymaking as the negotiator of treaties —
including trade agreements — with other countries, with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate.32 I have argued elsewhere that this power includes
the ability to take action related to diplomacy through trade, such as through
the imposition and lifting of trade embargos meant to achieve certain
political goals.33 However, there is little doubt that the President’s
Constitutional powers over trade are limited at best and rather are to be
dictated by the Congress, where those powers are housed.
International trade expanded slowly throughout the nineteenth
century.34 And throughout that period, import tariffs were largely utilized as
a form of government revenue as well as a form of protection against
competing imports.35 High tariffs and mercantilist policies spurred domestic
industrialization but constrained rapid growth in international trade
throughout this period.
Tariffs bounced up and down throughout the nineteenth century largely
due to differences of opinion between the cotton-exporting Southern states,
which preferred low tariffs, and the industrializing Northern states, which
wanted to protect their nascent industry with high tariffs.36 The early United
30. See, e.g., CAITLAINDEVEREAUX LEWIS supra note 23, at 2 (“Prior to the early 1930s,
Congress itself usually set tariff rates for imported products.”).
31. See CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS supra note 23, at 2 (“From 1934 until 1974,
Congress continued to enact legislation delegating some authority to the President to negotiate
tariff rates with other countries within pre–approved levels, and to implement agreed-upon
tariff rates through proclamation, rather than through congressional legislation.”).
32. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The president has the “Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.”).
33. Kevin J. Fandl, Adios Embargo: The Case for Executive Termination of the U.S.
Embargo on Cuba, 54 AM. BUS. L. J. 293–346 (Summer 2017) (justifying the Executive’s
unilateral power to terminate the trade embargo on Cuba on the basis of foreign policy power
rather than trade power).
34. See, e.g., Douglas A. Irwin, Historical Aspects of U.S. Trade Policy, NBER
REPORTER, Summer 2006, at 17–18 (explaining that U.S. trade policy shifted from focusing
on agricultural protection to emphasizing industrial exports in the early 20th century).
35. Douglas A. Irwin, Tariffs and Growth in Late Nineteenth Century America, 12 (June
2000) (unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College), https://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/do
cs/Growth.pdf [https://perma.cc/XD86-JVU2].
36. DOUGLASA. IRWIN, CLASHINGOVERCOMMERCE, 12–13 (2017).
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Democrat James Polk took office in 1844 after running a successful
campaign favoring reduced tariffs to protect Southern cotton farmers.41 He
facilitated the enactment of the 1846 Walker Tariff, which reduced most
import tariffs and may have helped set in motion the North-South showdown
leading to the Civil War.42 With the emergence of the powerful and rapidly-
industrializing North after the Civil War, a policy of protectionism prevailed,
implemented in earnest by the Republican leadership at the end of the
nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries. Major enactments, including
the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 and the Dingley Tariff Act, raised average
tariffs on imported goods to as high as 52%.43 Republicans argued that these
were necessary to protect the growth of the American industrial sector,
mainly in the North.
The agriculture sector of the nineteenth century United States was most
harmed by the high tariffs favored by the industrializing North.44 The United
States grew its historic economy out of cotton. The boom in cotton, which
began in the late eighteenth century, put the United States on the map as a
major global commercial player.45 By the mid-nineteenth century, U.S.
cotton exports accounted for close to 80% of British consumption.46 And by
the start of the Civil War in 1861, cotton exports comprised 61% of the value
of all U.S. exports. And while it seems clear that the comparative advantage
the United States had in producing cotton so efficiently came from the
reliance on slave labor, the fact is that King Cotton was a powerful industry
and a major contributor to the growth of the early United States.
The efficient production of cotton in the early United States meant
opportunity for income from exports. During the Civil War, for instance, the
Confederacy in the South struggled to effectively finance their wartime
operations because their entire economy consisted of cotton exports to
Britain rather than a broader domestic tax base, as had been developing in
the North.47 The ultimate prohibition of slavery through the Thirteenth
41. See John C. Pinheiro, James K. Polk: Domestic Affairs, THEMILLERCENTER, https:/
/millercenter.org/president/polk/domestic-affairs [https://perma.cc/88HR-KA2C] (last visited
Oct. 20, 2020) (explaining that Polk opposed protective tariffs in general but supported those
that protected disadvantaged domestic industries).
42. See generally Scott C. James & David A. Lake, The Second Face of Hegemony:
Britain’s Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846, 43 INT’LORG. 1,
1–2 (1989) (discussing how the Walker Tariff affected relations between Northern and
Southern states).
43. DOUGLASA. IRWIN, supra note 36, at 296.
44. DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, supra note 36, at 176 (explaining the Compromise of 1833 and
how South Carolina’s agriculture sector was particularly affected by new tariffs).
45. Beckert, supra note 37.
46. Beckert, supra note 37.
47. SeeDOUGLASA. IRWIN, supra note 36, at 216 (describing the conflicting views about
influencing British policy toward the Confederacy, such as restricting cotton exports to force
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the southern states increasingly concerned about the growing power of the
North in driving tariff decisions. A Senator made the following comment in
1892 about the importance of cotton and the fight against tariffs:
The existing tariff is an obstruction to healthy and legitimate
commerce. It narrows and restricts the markets for American
products, and especially those of agriculture. It is based upon the
idea that the American farmer must look to the homemarket alone,
and if that does not give remunerative prices for his surplus, the
loss must be borne patiently and patriotically for the general
welfare.51
Despite this powerful force against tariffs in the South, the American
voting population was concentrated in the North, where industry was
beginning to develop and where industrialists demanded protection from
foreign competition. As Republicans maintained control of power from the
end of the Civil War through World War I, they were willing to
accommodate these demands, keeping America a protectionist country and
allowing rapid industrialization to take place, almost entirely concentrated in
the northern states.52 The continued push for tariffs to protect infant industry
in the North paid off as U.S. industry became efficient enough to compete
on world markets by the early 1900s.
The election of progressive Democrat Woodrow Wilson in 1912, along
with the capture of Congress by the Democrats, led to a policy of reducing
tariffs and promoting more free trade. At that time, the Democratic party
platform was opposed to the implementation of tariffs for the purpose of
protecting domestic industry.53 Rather, they believed that tariff policy should
be solely focused on government revenue:
We declare it to be a fundamental principle of the Democratic
party that the Federal government, under the Constitution, has no
right or power to impose or collect tariff duties, except for the
purpose of revenue, and we demand that the collection of such
taxes shall be limited to the necessities of government honestly
and economically administered.54
Following this radical shift in trade policy, Democrats in Congress took
51. G. G. Vest, The Real Issue, 431 N. AM. REV. 401, 402–03 (1892).
52. See generally Benjamin O. Fordham, Protectionist Empire: Trade, Tariffs, and
United States Foreign Policy, 1890-1914, 31 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 170, 170–73 (2017)
(providing a comprehensive foreign policy analysis of the use of tariff as trade policy prior to
World War I).
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steps to substantially reduce protective tariffs and unchain the federal
government from the increasingly large businesses that they had been
supporting with protective tariffs in the past. Shortly after taking office in
1913, President Wilson spoke to a joint session of Congress about tariffs:
We long ago passed beyond the modest notion of “protecting” the
industries of the country and moved boldly forward to the idea that
they were entitled to the direct patronage of the Government. For
a long time—a time so long that the men now active in public
policy hardly remember the conditions that preceded it—we have
sought in our tariff schedules to give each group of manufacturers
or producers what they themselves thought that they needed in
order to maintain a practically exclusive market as against the rest
of the world. Consciously or unconsciously, we have built up a set
of privileges and exemptions from competition behind which it
was easy by any, even the crudest, forms of combination to
organize monopoly; until at last nothing is normal, nothing is
obliged to stand the tests of efficiency and economy, in our world
of big business, but everything thrives by concerted arrangement.55
Wilson went further and explained that the only duties that ought to be
maintained in the interest of revenue were those on imports of goods that the
United States did not produce.56 His goal, therefore, was to create a free
market that eliminated unfair competition through government supports in
the form of tariffs. The Democratically controlled Congress enacted these
reforms with minimal Republican support in 1913, bringing average tariffs
down from 40% to 27%, and the percentage of duty-free imports rose from
54% to 69% by 1916.57
The impact of this new progressive trade policy was felt
immediately. Manufactured exports from the United States dramatically
increased, while imports remained largely stable, generating a substantial
trade surplus for the United States of $4 billion by 1919.58 However, lower
55. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Tariff
Reform, (Apr. 8, 1913), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-8-
1913-message-regarding-tariff-duties [https://perma.cc/MJ37-ZYZ4].
56. See id. (“We must abolish everything that bears even the semblance of privilege or
of any kind of artificial advantage, and put our business men and producers under the
stimulation of a constant necessity to be efficient, economical, and enterprising, masters of
competitive supremacy, better workers and merchants than any in the world. Aside from the
duties laid upon articles which we do not, and probably cannot, produce, therefore, and the
duties laid upon luxuries and merely for the sake of the revenues they yield, the object of the
tariff duties henceforth laid must be effective competition, the whetting of American wits by
contest with the wits of the rest of the world.”).
57. DOUGLASA. IRWIN, supra note 36, at 338.
58. SeeDOUGLASA. IRWIN, supra note 36 (describing the increase from a surplus of $471
million in 1914 to $4 billion by 1919).
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in foreign affairs after the war ended in 1918. Lack of U.S. leadership at the
time left European allies with the power to assert control over Germany by
forcing rigid reparations for their aggressions in the war.65 In the United
States, Republicans regained control of Congress and won the Presidency in
1920, using their power to reverse the liberalization that began with the
Underwood Tariff.66 U.S. farmers in particular were hurt in the post-war
period as European farmers rebounded from the war and their demand for
imports withered.
The new Warren Harding Republican administration signed into law
the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921,67 as well as the 1922 Fordney-McCumber
Act,68 each of which raised the level of import tariffs in order to protect
domestic farming and industry. The increased tariffs did not help U.S.
farmers, who faced more serious concerns over declining global agricultural
prices due to overproduction. Republican Herbert Hoover, who took office
in 1928, promised more protection for the farmers. But once the tariff wallet
was opened, other American producers wanted their fair share as well.69 This
led to passage of the 1930 Tariff Act.70
The Tariff Act of 1930, notoriously known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act, raised tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods.71 The effects of that Act
are debated, but evidence suggests that the slowdown in international trade
resulting from higher tariffs in the United States, and retaliatory tariffs
among U.S. trading partners, may have extended the effects of the Great
Depression and the global economic downturn. A key part of that Act is the
Congressional delegation of power to the President to raise tariffs on imports
when he determines that the exporting country has unreasonably restricted
U.S. exports or when foreign imports discriminate against domestic
producers.72
65. See, e.g., Versailles Revisited, THE ECONOMIST, July 6, 2019, at 14 (providing an
insightful analysis of the impact of reparation payments on Germany via the Treaty of
Versailles).
66. See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, supra note 36, at 349 (describing the immediate return to
protectionism once Republicans took control of Congress and the Presidency in 1920).
67. Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-10, 42 Stat. 9-19 (1921).
68. Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 858 (1922).
69. See Protectionism in the Interwar Period, DEP’T OF STATEOFFICE OF THEHISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/protectionism [https://perma.cc/HZ5B-SS3F]
(last visited Oct. 22, 2020) (discussing the increased demand to raise tariffs across all sectors
of the economy).
70. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
71. Id.
72. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, §338(a), 46 Stat. 704 (1930) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §1338(a)) (“The President when he finds that the public interest will be served thereby
shall by proclamation specify and declare new or additional duties as hereinafter provided
upon articles wholly or in part the growth or product of, or imported in a vessel of, any foreign
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The impact of the 1930 Tariff Act has been debated extensively.73 What
is clear, however, is that it failed to alleviate the worsening global recession
and the dramatic decline in international trade. The Act was originally
intended to provide protection to farmers in the face of increasing
agricultural imports; however, what is often overlooked is at this time, the
economy was doing particularly well, with low unemployment and strong
economic growth.74 As word got out that the farmers were getting tariff
protection, a number of other industries requested the same protection,
resulting in over 800 goods receiving some form of tariff protection in the
Act.75
Economists have largely assumed that the Great Depression was caused
in large part due to the October 1929 stock market crash. Some other
theorists, however, have asserted that the 1930 Tariff Act itself was the
principal cause of the risky trading leading to the 1929 crash and subsequent
depression.76 In either case, we can see similarities between the actions taken
by the Hoover Administration in 1930 and those taken by the Trump
Administration in 2019.77 Recovering from the effects of the 1930 Act
required broad new trade legislation, something unlikely in the political
environment of 2020.
country whenever he shall find as a fact that such country—(1) Imposes, directly or indirectly,
upon the disposition in or transportation in transit through or reexportation from such country
of any article wholly or in part the growth or product of the United States any unreasonable
charge, exaction, regulation, or limitation which is not equally enforced upon the like articles
of every foreign country; or (2) Discriminates in fact against the commerce of the United
States . . . .”).
73. See, e.g., John Steele Gordon, A Bad Law, Badly Timed, BARRONS (Apr. 21, 2017)
https://www.barrons.com/articles/smoot-hawley-tariff-a-bad-law-badly-timed-1492833567
[https://perma.cc/7FCM-BDFW] (discussing the strong opposition to the bill by economists
and industrialists alike); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PEDDLING PROTECTIONISM: SMOOT–HAWLEY
AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 2011 (providing an in-depth examination of the effects of the
Act on the extent of the Great Depression).
74. David Greene, Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: A Classic Economics Horror Story, NAT’L
PUB. RAD. (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/05/599707003/smoot-hawley-tariff-
act-a-classic-economics-horror-story [https://perma.cc/29D5-KK93] (interviewing Douglas
Irwin and Sally Helm about the effects of the Act).
75. Id.
76. See Alan Reynolds, What Do We Know about the Great Crash?, Nat’l Rev., Nov. 9,
1979, at 1416 (arguing that investors act on information affecting future decisions, making it
likely that the pending Act would have affected decisions made by investors even before the
bill became law).
77. See, e.g., Chad P. Bown and Eva Zhang, Trump’s 2019 Protection Could Push China
Back to Smoot-Hawley Tariff Levels, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., (May 14, 2019,
5:00PM) https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-2019-prote
ction-could-push-china-back-smoot-hawley [https://perma.cc/C4FZ-EGBV] (discussing the
potential effects of the tariffs on Chinese exports on the global trading system and likening
them to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act).
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B. Delegation of Tariff Policy to the Executive
The effects of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act were felt immediately and
broadly across the U.S. and global economies. The political fallout was
unmistakable as Democrats swept into Congress and the White House in the
1932 election, bringing Franklin Delano Roosevelt to power in the midst of
the Great Depression.78 Until this time, trade policy power remained in the
Congress, where the Constitution designated it.79 The Democratically
controlled Congress of 1934 dramatically changed this approach with
passage of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA).
The RTAA was the first congressional delegation of trade power to the
President that authorized him to lower tariffs in order to pursue a progressive
trade liberalization policy.80 That Act enabled the President, from time to
time,81 to modify duties and other import restrictions as part of any trade
agreements that he enters into. In other words, the RTAA empowered the
President to negotiate trade agreements that included adjustments to import
tariff rates, as well as other restrictions. More precisely, it allowed the
President to lower tariffs on goods from certain countries in the interest of
moderating the free trade environment in a favorable manner.82
The 1934 Act was the first time Congress delegated its trade authority
to the President, and it did so on a limited basis—subject to re-authorization
every three years. The Act was a strategic maneuver by newly elected
President Roosevelt and his astute Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, given the
distaste in Congress for tariff reductions in the midst of the Great
Depression.83 Because the Act was reciprocal in nature and limited in scope,
78. See Douglas A. Irwin, From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements:
Changing the Course of U.S. Trade Policy in the 1930s in MICHAEL D. BORDO, CLAUDIA
GOLDEN AND EUGENE N. WHITE, THE DEFININGMOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 325 (1998) (describing trade policy
changes resulting from the political changes following the electoral sweep in 1932).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
80. Reciprocal Tariff Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1939) (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. §1351(a)) (“[T]he President, whenever he finds as a fact that any existing duties or
other import restrictions of the United States or any foreign country are unduly burdening and
restricting the foreign trade of the United States . . . is authorized from time to time . . . [t]o
proclaim suchmodifications of existing duties and other import restrictions, or such additional
import restrictions, or such continuance, and for such minimum periods, of existing customs
or excise treatment of any article covered by foreign trade agreements, as are required or
appropriate to carry out any foreign trade agreement that the President has entered into
hereunder.”).
81. But see Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, §5(b), Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40
Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305(b)(1)(B)) (enabling the President
to take actions related to imports and exports during time of war).
82. Irwin, supra note 78, at 325.
83. See WILLIAM KRIST, GLOBALIZATION AND AMERICA’S TRADE AGREEMENT, (2009)
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the threat of surging imports that would further weaken the U.S. economy
was minimized, while the power of the President to use trade as a means to
expand opportunities for U.S. exporters was enhanced.
President Roosevelt wasted little time in using the newly delegated
power from the RTAA to enter trade agreements with a number of countries,
beginning with Cuba in 1934.84 By 1945, at the dawning of the world trade
system, the United States had entered into reciprocal trade agreements with
twenty-eight countries.85 And because the delegated authority did not require
congressional authorization for the new agreements the President entered
into, the process was swift and certain. This authority, which had been
successively renewed every three years, was also utilized by President
Truman when negotiating and signing the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1947, which was implemented in the United States via
Executive Order under the authority if the RTAA.86
In making his case to Congress in 1945 for another extension of the
RTAA, President Roosevelt said “we cannot succeed in building a peaceful
world unless we build an economically healthy world.”87 Congress
authorized the Act every three years through 1962. By 1962, the world trade
landscape had shifted dramatically. While the Cold War raged on, Europe
had consolidated its growing economic power into the European Economic
Community via the 1957 Treaty of Rome. This led President Kennedy to
fear that U.S. exporters would lose access to European markets, which now
had borderless access to neighboring countries within the new customs
union. Kennedy pushed for trade authority that went beyond the RTAA by
enabling him to negotiate a 50% reduction in current tariff levels and also to
increase tariffs by 50% from their 1934 levels if necessary.88
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/chapter-1-us-trade-policy-crisis#_ftn10 [https://perma.cc/6PA
H-WVTK] (discussing the movement to preserve tariffs as the means to decrease the
unemployment rate in the United States and to restore the American standard of living).
84. Reciprocal Trade Agreement with Cuba of 1934, Cuba-U.S., Aug. 24, 1934, 49 Stat.
3559 (entered into with force Sept. 3, 1934).
85. Irwin, supra note 78, at 343–45.
86. See, e.g., ThomasWilliam France, The Domestic Legal Status of the GATT: The Need
for Clarification, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1481, 1482 (1994) (suggesting that, though
Congress recognized the authority of the original GATT agreement, no implementing
legislation was ever enacted); John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 265 (1967) (“The theory of the
executive branch has been that GATT was authorized by a combination of existing statutes
and presidential power, and that therefore there was no need to submit it to Congress.”).
87. Recommendation for Renewal of Trade Agreements Act, DEP’T OF ST. BULL., April
1945, at 531.
88. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, GATT AND THE KENNEDY ROUND, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCEAGENCY (1964) (describing the tense state of affairs as President de Gaulle of
France shut out the United Kingdom from the European Common Market and appeared to be
taking protectionist measures that could harm U.S. exporters).
358 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 23:2
The new trade environment created by the RTAA largely reflected a
relational approach to trade, emphasizing the need to trade not only goods
but also access. Scholar Doug Irwin argued that the Democrats could easily
have repealed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act when they took control in 1932
but they chose not to.89 His theory is that they were aware of the changed
environment of trade, with retaliatory trade barriers erected around the world
that would not suddenly come down in the event of a full repeal.90 Thus, the
better approach was to target those countries with whom we had particular
trade relationships that we wanted to improve upon. This created the
reciprocal approach that was utilized through the creation of theWorld Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1995.
Republican opposition to the RTAA was largely muted during World
War II, especially as U.S. manufacturers had achieved superior abilities to
provide the implements necessary for the war, driving U.S. economic
growth.91 Following the war, trade became more intertwined with national
security concerns. The GATT, signed in 1947, was the set of rules that would
govern a new world of trade and promote peaceful interactions that benefited
the new global community that existed after the war.92 A national security
exception was built into the GATT, allowing countries to raise tariffs in the
event of a threat to their domestic security, highlighting the ongoing concerns
about economic and political relations of this period.93 This will be
addressed in more detail below.
The RTAA provided the President with broad, though temporary,
authority to control tariffs. While he could not determine which goods were
dutiable and which were not, he was authorized to increase or decrease the
tariff on any dutiable good by up to 50%.94 This new executive authority
signaled a shift in how trade policy would be carried on for years to come.95
The next period in global trade and political history was the Cold War,
which developed after the end ofWorldWar II when the Soviets, disgruntled
by the late and limited involvement of the United States, began their
expansion into Eastern Europe in the early 1940s. Politically, the United
89. Id. at 326 (making the case for a reciprocal approach to tariff reduction rather than a
one-way opening).
90. Id.
91. Id. (suggesting that Republicans would have tried to repeal the RTAA but for the
strong economic growth resulting since its implementation).
92. Id. (confirming that the republicans would not reverse the new approach to
consensus-based trade with the rise of U.S. power following World War II).
93. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
94. Irwin, supra note 78, at 341.
95. Irwin, supra note 78, at 341–42 (discussing how interest groups took little notice of
this legislation as they could not anticipate how it would be used, despite the fact that it
became foundational for trade policy for decades to come).
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States was following the approach of “containment,” trying to limit Soviet
expansion without directly confronting them. Economically, this policy
involved economic isolation and the conversion of trade policy into national
security policy.
By 1947, the nexus between trade and national security was clear.
President Truman set in motion the future of U.S. foreign relations, mainly
in Europe, by asserting that the United States would support those countries
seeking freedom from communism. This “Truman Doctrine” became the
foundation for the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), which remains
in effect today, and which works to promote national security in Europe and
to protect markets for U.S. exports.96 Free trade, however, became linked
also to communism, as the Republicans asserted their worries over the effects
on domestic industry. One Republican Senator at the time noted, “Reds in
the United States continually whoop it up for further tariff reductions
because they realize that removal of tariff protection is one of the surest ways
of bankrupting the United States industry.”97 This was a very dramatic shift
from political sentiments just a few decades earlier.
Cases linking trade protection and national security abounded during
the Cold War. The sardine industry argued that they deserved protection
because their fisherman could act as spies. The glassware industry argued
for protection because they supplied the majority of blown glass tubes
essential to the war effort.98 At the same time, the Truman Administration
was advocating for free trade in the interest of national security. At a speech
in 1947, Truman said, “we cannot find security in isolation . . . [because the
nation’s] foreign relations, political and economic, are indivisible.”99 In
1949, Senator A. Willis Robertson asked, rhetorically, “[w]hat is the cold
war about? It is over trade.”100
Throughout the Cold War period, trade protection became synonymous
with national security. Defensive tariffs were justified on the basis of
protecting U.S. interests. As economic development enabled more efficient
96. Thomas W. Zeiler, Managing Protectionism: American Trade Policy and the Cold
War, 22 DIPLOMATICHIST. 337, 344 (1998) (“Liberal trade was crucial for [the United States
and Western Europe] and thus was essential to national security.”).
97. Id. at 345–46.
98. Brief from J. J. Smith on Opposing Reduction in Tariff on Canned Sardines in
HEARINGS ON THE OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT AND THE PROPOSED
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, 80TH CONG., 643–44 (1947); Letter from the
American Glassware Association to the Committee for Reciprocity Information on Urging to
Protect Job Opportunities in the Glassware Industry by Tariff Protection inHEARINGS ON THE
OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT AND THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION, 80THCONG. 811–12 (1947).
99. Harry S. Truman, Address Delivered at Baylor University: Foreign and Economic
Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 167 (March 6, 1947).
100. 81 CONG. REC. 12,623 (1949).
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production abroad, domestic industries were increasingly threatened.
Economic protection was sought on the basis of national security, and new
trade acts reflected this shift in focus.101
BACKGROUND TO THENATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
One of the underlying questions that this article must address is how
national security became entwined with trade policy and whether limits exist
to the President’s use of the national security exception to block imports.
Some have argued that there is a “reciprocal and dynamic interaction in
international relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power.”102
Nowhere does that interaction resonate more soundly than in trade policy.
To begin, I will briefly trace the key acts that have shifted congressional
power to the President over trade. These steps are critical in understanding
the progression of a shifting balance of power over trade policy.
The National Security exception did not appear in statutory form until
the height of the Cold War in 1962, just as the Soviet Union was working
with Cuba to position its military apparatus close to the mainland United
States.103 Prior to that authorization, the focus of congressional delegations
to the President for trade were on negotiating reductions in tariffs, not in
imposing additional tariffs. The first delegation of trade power to the
President was the 1934 RTAA, which I discussed above.
Though it would be another eight years before the national security
exception we know today would come into existence, the Trade Act of 1954,
passed just after the Korean War, made the first association of national
defense with trade.104 That Act included a provision that modified the former
delegation of authority to enable the President to prevent trade benefits if
“the President finds that such reduction would threaten domestic production
needed for projected national defense requirements.”105 It is worth noting
that the National Security Act, which substantially consolidated military and
101. See Zeiler, supra note 96 at 350–60 (arguing that national security served the interests
of sectors affected by increasing free trade and efficiency by foreign industries).
102. ROBERTGILPIN, U.S. POWER AND THEMULTINATIONALCORPORATION 43 (1975); see
also ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 21–22 (1984) (discussing Robert Gilpin’s
definition of international political economy).
103. See generally Kevin J. Fandl, Adios Embargo: The Case for Executive Termination
of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 293–346 (2017) (providing a thorough
history of the relationship between the United States and Cuba).
104. See RACHEL F. FEFER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232
INVESTIGATIONS OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 36–37 (2019) (“Concern over
national security, trade, and domestic industry was first raised by the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1954.”) (Internal citation omitted).
105. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1954, ch. 445, § 2, 68 Stat. 360, 360 (1954)
(granting the President a one-year extension of his RTAA trade negotiating authority).
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foreign policy elements of the federal government, was enacted in 1947, just
seven years prior to the Trade Act.
The 1954 Act, though significant in its addition of a national security
clause, did little to provide structure around the use of that exception. In
particular, it restricted the President from providing a trade agreement
benefit if, after his own investigation, the President determines that such a
benefit would increase imports in a manner affecting domestic production
needed for projected national security requirements.106 Because the authority
in the 1954 Act expired after one year, an extension was passed in 1955 that
included more precise language about the use of the national security
exemption.107 That Act added a process by which the Director of the Office
of Defense Mobilization (ODM) would be responsible for carrying out an
investigation into potential national security threats from imports. Upon his
recommendation, the President was required to initiate his own investigation
and, if appropriate, take actions to restrict imports.108
The 1958 Act essentially codified an investigatory procedure by which
the head of the ODM would still examine potential threats to national
security related to imported goods and make a recommendation to the
President on the basis of that investigation; however, this Act required the
President to take action unless the President determines that the imports do
not pose a national security threat.109 In the discussion of the 1958 Act, the
Senate Finance Committee said the following: “As was the purpose when
the national security section was added in the 1955 extension of the Act, the
amendments are designed to give the President unquestioned authority to
limit imports which threaten to impair defense-essential industries.”110 This
was a substantial expansion of the President’s powers to restrict trade
benefits on the grounds of national security, as the Committee itself
106. Id.
107. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, 69 Stat. 162 (1955).
108. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 sec. 7, § 2(b) (“In order to further the policy
and purpose of this section, whenever the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization has
reason to believe that any article is being imported into the United States in such quantities as
to threaten to impair the national security, he shall so advise the President, and if the President
agrees that there is reason for such belief, the President shall cause an immediate investigation
to be made to determine the facts. If, on the basis of such investigation, and the report to him
of the findings and recommendations made in connection therewith, the President finds that
the article is being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair
the national security, he shall take such action as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of
such article to a level that will not threaten to impair the national security.”).
109. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, . L. No. 85-686, sec. 8, § 2(b), 72 Stat.
673, 678 (1958).
110. COMM. ON FIN., TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT OF 1958, S. REP. NO. 1838, at
5–6 (1958) (emphasis added).
362 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 23:2
recognized.111
The 1958 Act requires the Director of the ODCM to initiate an
investigation at the request of any interested party or of his own accord. If
that Director, after considering the possible impact of imports on the national
economy, believes that such imports pose a national security threat, he shall
promptly advise the President accordingly.112 Those findings should be
based upon the following non-exclusive list:
• domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements
• capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense
requirements
• existing and anticipated availabilit[y] of the human resources,
products, raw materials, and other supplies and services
essential to national defense
• investment, exploration and development necessary to support
industrial growth113
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which I will unpack in more detail
in the next section, left the requirements and procedures largely unchanged
from the 1958 Act, other than replacing the role of the Director of the ODCM
with the Director of Emergency Planning.114 The former provision was
located in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. The 1974 Trade Act
further updated the investigative authority, naming the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense, as
the starting point for national security investigations over imports.115 A limit
on this authority was added with the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of
1980, which allowed Congress to enact a resolution of disapproval to
overturn Section 232 actions related to petroleum or petroleum products.116
The most substantial changes since § 232 was codified in 1962 were in
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.117 That Act once again
relocated investigatory authority to the Department of Commerce in
consultation with the Department of Defense, removing Treasury altogether.
In addition, the Act required the Secretary of Commerce to hold a public
hearing or otherwise permit public comment on any § 232 investigation, and
111. Id. at 6 (noting that “[t]he authority of the President is thereby broadened
considerably”).
112. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958 § 8.
113. Id.
114. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, (1962).
115. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, sec. 127, § 232, 88 Stat. 1978, 1993 (1975).
116. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of 1980, Pub. L. No. 26-223, sec. 402, § 232, 94 Stat.
229, 301 (1980).
117. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988).
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it added a deadline of 270 days for those investigations to be concluded.
Once a recommendation was delivered to the President, he has 90 days to act
on that recommendation. No further changes to that section of the Act have
been made since 1988.
CLARIFYING THEMEANING OFNATIONAL SECURITY IN TRADE
With that background on the relationship between national security and
the congressional delegation of trade power to the President, we turn to the
more immediate situation of invoking that power as a means of restricting
trade. The Trump Administration in particular has been adamant about
relying on national security as a justification for trade restrictions. As noted
by Peterson Institute Senior Fellow Chad Bown, “To this administration,
everything is about national security.”118 Similarly, the White House’s trade
advisor Peter Navarro said in an interview with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) that “Economic security is national security.”119
This echoes the language of the Senate Finance Committee in the passage of
the 1958 Trade Agreements Extension Act, in which they said, “[T]he
country’s national security is tied closely to its internal economic welfare.”120
Thus, national security can serve as a justification for economic sanctions to
those who would link the two together.
The problem for making the link between national and economic
security in the United States is the separation of powers. It is not entirely
clear from a legal perspective which branch of government — the legislative
or executive — has the power to unilaterally control trade sanctions in the
interest of national security. Traditionally, the legislative branch has
controlled international trade law,121 while the Executive has controlled most
national security decisions. Drawing the connection between the two, then,
should require collaboration between the two branches. For purposes of our
discussion here, it may make sense to briefly trace the origin of this power
before we address in whose hands it lies.
When President Kennedy was elected in 1961, he was facing a new
118. Ana Swanson & Paul Mozur, Trump Mixes Economic and National Security,
Plunging the U.S. Into Multiple Fights, N.Y. Times (June 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2019/06/08/business/trump-economy-national-security.html [https://perma.cc/5FTV-ZBG
B].
119. Interview by Andrew Phillip Hunter with Peter Navarro, Assistant to the President
and Dir. of the White House Office of Trade & Mfg. Policy, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 9,
2018).
120. COMM. ON FIN., TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT OF 1958, S. REP. NO. 1838, at
12 (1958).
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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world for politics and trade. The European Economic Community (EEC),
which was formed in 1957, had unified the European countries for political
and economic purposes and formed a significant trading bloc of increasingly
wealthy consumers for U.S. exports. Accordingly, free trade was on the
mind of President Kennedy, who said that the United States needs to “trade
or fade.”122 The 1962 Trade Expansion Act, considered one of the most
significant achievements of Kennedy’s administration, created the office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, solidified executive power to negotiate trade
agreements, and created the trade adjustment assistance program to assist
industries impacted by more open trade.123
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was the most significant expression
to date of the Administration’s effort to utilize trade policy as a major
component of national security policy. As President Kennedy noted on the
enactment of this Act:
This act recognizes, fully and completely, that we cannot protect
our economy by stagnating behind tariff walls, but that the best
protection possible is a mutual lowering of tariff barriers among
friendly nations so that all may benefit from a free flow of goods.
Increased economic activity resulting from increased trade will
provide more job opportunities for our workers. . . . The results
can bring a dynamic new era of growth. . . . A vital expanding
economy in the free world is a strong counter to the threat of the
world Communist movement. This act is, therefore, an important
new weapon to advance the cause of freedom.124
The Act followed previous trade acts in granting the Executive
temporary power to lower tariffs with trading partners through the
negotiation of trade agreements. The 1962 Trade Expansion Act also granted
the Executive the power to raise tariffs in the event of a threat to the national
security of the United States.125 Though similar power appeared in previous
trade acts,126 Section 232 provided more clarity in the procedure for initiating
122. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 87TH CONG.,
LEGISLATIVEHISTORY OFH.R. 11970, at 1390 (1967).
123. The Trade Expansion Act, CQ ALMANAC, https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/do
cument.php?id=cqal62-1326212 [https://perma.cc/RDP4-EGQW].
124. 108 CONG. REC. S21,927 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1962) (President’s Remarks upon the
Signing of H.R. 11970, The Trade Expansion Act of 1962).
125. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 872, 877 (1962).
126. See, e.g., Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1954, ch. 445, § 2, 68 Stat. 360, 360
(1954) (“No action shall be taken . . . to decrease the duty on any article if the President finds
that such reduction would threaten domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements.”); Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, sec. 7, § 2(b), 69 Stat.
162 (1955) (authorizing the President to adjust imports to safeguard national security); Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, sec. 8, § 2(b), 72 Stat. 673 (1958)
(authorizing the President to adjust imports on the basis of national security).
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and conducting an investigation and imposing tariffs under this provision.
In particular, the 1962 Trade Expansion Act builds on the 1930 Act by
allowing the President, upon investigation by the Secretary of Commerce, to
enact import restrictions on trade that threatens to impair the national
security of the United States.127
Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act enables the President to
impose import restrictions (i.e., tariffs) on goods “being imported into the
United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten
to impair the national security.”128 The Department of Commerce may
initiate an investigation 1) in response to a request from industry; 2) at the
request of the head of a U.S. government agency; or 3) of its own accord in
the Executive branch.129
Once an investigation under this section of the Trade Act is initiated,
the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within the Department of
Commerce may hold public hearings or seek public comments.130 The BIS
is required to take into account the following factors when making their
determination: (1) domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements; (2) domestic capacity; (3) the availability of human
resources and supplies essential to the national defense; and (4) potential
unemployment, loss of skills or investment, or decline in government
revenues resulting from displacement of any domestic products by excessive
imports.131 Within 270 days of initiating the investigation, the Secretary of
Commerce has 270 days to provide a report to the President advising him on
whether imports are entering the United States “in such quantities or under
such circumstances as to threaten to impair” the national security of the
United States.132 From that point, the President has 90 days to adopt the
report, reject the report, or choose not to take action at all.133 Following his
decision, the President has 15 days to implement that decision and 30 days
127. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, §232(b)-(c), 76 Stat. 877 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §1862(b)-(c)) (If the Secretary of Commerce “finds that an article is
being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security,” then the President is authorized to take “such other
actions as the President deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article so that such
imports will not threaten to impair the national security”). See also CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX
LEWIS, supra note 31, at 4 (highlighting § 232(b)-(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
empowering the President to take necessary actions to adjust trade imports to maintain
national security).
128. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A).
129. Id. at § 1862(b)(1).
130. Id. at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2018).
131. Id. at § 1862(d).
132. Id. at § 1862(b)(3)(A).
133. Id. at § 1862(c).
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to notify Congress of his decision and associated actions.134
Similar legislation was enacted subsequent to the 1962 Trade
Expansion Act. Principally, the Trade Act of 1974 allowed the President to
modify duty rates in response to market access restrictions abroad,135 or to
provide special treatment to certain countries.136 The 1977 International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) gave the President substantial
power to restrict trade with certain countries or nationals of those countries
in the event of an unusual or extraordinary foreign threat to U.S. national
security, foreign policy, or the U.S. economy.137
No further far-reaching legislation was enacted since 1977 empowering
the President to determine import restrictions or tariff levels. However, a
number of provisions providing localized power were included in subsequent
trade agreements. This includes the North America Free Trade Agreement
of 1993,138 the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994,139 and the
Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement of 2005.140
None of these agreements are the focus of the import restrictions being
examined in this article.
Between 1962 and 2016, section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 was utilized twenty-six times.141 In only eight of those cases did a
President take action to restrict trade on the basis of national security.142 The
Trump Administration has relied heavily on the use of this section to justify
increases in tariffs on imports, as discussed in more detail below. This shift
in trade policy signals an end to the progressive era associating trade
liberalization with national security and democratization, and suggests a new
moment of protectionism, possibly violating our obligations under
international trade rules that did not exist when the progressive move toward
134. Id. at § 1862(c)(1)(B)-(2).
135. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–617, §301, 88 Stat. 2001 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §2132).
136. Id. at § 501.
137. International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, P.L. 95-223, §203(a)(1)(B),
91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B)).
138. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
§201, 107 Stat. 2068 (1993) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §3331(a)(1)).
139. Uruguay RoundAgreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465 §111(a), 108 Stat. 4819 (1994)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §3521(a)). For a complete discussion of the implications of this
authority, see Essential Security at the World Trade Organization discussion below.
140. Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade, Pub. L. No. 109-53, §201(a), 119
Stat. 467 (2005), (codified at 19 U.S.C. §4031(a)).
141. Paul Bettencourt, “Essentially Limitless”: Restraining Administrative Overreach
Under Section 232, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 716 (explaining the minimal application
of Section 232 prior to the Trump Administration).
142. See RACHEL FEFER ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., SECTION 232
INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3–5 (2019) (discussing
Section 232 investigations in which the President took action).
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liberalization began. To better understand this new moment in trade policy,
I will examine in the next section the prior uses of national security as a
justification to import restrictions.
THE SCOPE OF THE SECTION 232 NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. sets the tone
and establishes the precedent for our current state of affairs related to
national security and trade.143 This case involved the use of license fees as a
non-tariff restriction on imports in an instance in which tariffs seemed to be
ineffective. The case addressed the scope of the Section 232(b) power,
which had been widely seen as a power that allowed the president, upon the
recommendation of the U.S. Department of Commerce, to adjust imports
when those imports were affecting national security, not necessarily license
fees. The “adjustments” allowed previously under this exception were
typically quantitative restrictions—tariffs and quotas. Petitioners challenged
the use of non-quantitative measures as outside the scope of delegated power
under Section 232(b).
The problem began in 1959, when President Eisenhower was advised
that crude oil imports were entering the United States in such quantities as
to threaten the national security of the United States.144 The President
implemented theMandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP) under the authority
of Section 8 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1958,145 the predecessor to
Section 232(b).146 MOIP established quotas on oil imports in order to give
domestic oil refineries and producers time to “catch-up” to rising demand;
however, as with similar protectionist trade policies, demand outpaced the
development of new production, undermining the efforts of Eisenhower, as
well as Presidents Kennedy and Nixon thereafter.147
Rising demand for oil in the United States and slow growth in domestic
oil production largely frustrated the efforts of the executive in limiting oil
imports. Accordingly, President Nixon substantially modified the quota
program to convert it to a license fee program, charging a sum per barrel of
imported oil and raising that sum over a period of years.148 This program
was still ineffective in addressing the imbalance between domestic demand
and production by the time President Ford took office in 1974. By 1975,
President Ford decided to immediately advance the planned increases in
143. FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
144. Id. at 552.
145. Pub. L. No. 85-686, 72 Stat. 678 (1958).
146. Presidential Proclamation No. 3279, 3 CFR 11 (19591963 Comp.).
147. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 552–554.
148. Presidential Proclamation No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974).
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license fees that had been scheduled to phase-in over subsequent years.149
This action was the basis for the Algonquin lawsuit.
The question raised in the Algonquin case was whether the Executive
exceeded its delegated authority in establishing license fees on oil imports
and, if not, whether it did so in violation of proper procedural steps.150 The
Federal District Court found in favor of the government and upheld the
argument that the President had been congressionally-delegated the power to
use any means necessary to offset the threat, and that the imposition of
license fees here conformed to the statutory procedures.151
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia disagreed. That court
concluded that imposing license fees rather than tariffs or quotas was an
improper expansion of the delegated congressional authority.152 They
surmised that the delegation from Congress was quite clear and that reading
the statute to allow the President to take indirect actions to restrict imports
would run afoul of the delegated power.153 In the opinion of the Court, the
delegation only allowed the President to impose direct controls, such as
tariffs and quotas, and did not allow him to use license fees as was done
here.154
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the central finding of the appellate
court, concluding instead that the delegation is broad and expansive. They
relied upon precedent from the 1928 Hampton & Co. v. United States case,
which stated: “[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the [President] is directed to conform, such legislative
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”155 The Justices
contended that Congress had, in this case, laid down an intelligible principle
by requiring the President to act only upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of the Treasury, and that the statute constrains the President by
limiting his actions to those that would alleviate the national security threat
and no more.156
It is imperative to note here that the Court was not making a broad
judgment that the President is within his right to utilize any trade restriction
he chooses to limit imports in the interest of national security:
[O]ur conclusion here, fully supported by the relevant legislative
history, that the imposition of a license fee is authorized by §
149. Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, 3A CFR 2 (1975).
150. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 556.
151. Algonquin SNG Inc. v. Fed. Energy Admin. 518 F.2d 1051, 1062 (App. D.C. 1975).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1055.
154. Id. 1059.
155. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (emphasis added).
156. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 559 (finding that the delegation found in Section 232(b) easily
conforms to the intelligible principle test).
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232(b) in no way compels the further conclusion that any action
the President might take, as long as it has even a remote impact on
imports, is also so authorized.157
However, the limitations on that right never had an opportunity to be
outlined, as no further challenges were brought thereafter.
Since those Cold War cases, there had been little use of Section 232 by
the Executive branch. However, the Trump Administration has quickly
latched onto this provision as a justification for issuing a number of trade
sanctions against U.S. trading partners. This has led to strong reactions
among the trade policy community in both liberal and conservative circles,
as well as calls for revision of the statute or even rescission of the
congressional delegation of power to the President. In 2019, the American
Institute for International Steel brought a legal challenge against the Trump
Administration for its use of this provision. I discuss the case in more detail
below.
In a 2019 article from the conservative Heritage Foundation, Tori
Whiting and Riley Walters advocate for reform of the Section 232: “Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is an antiquated trade tool that gives
the executive branch virtually unchecked authority to impose or increase
tariffs on U.S. imports if those imports are thought to threaten U.S. national
security.”158 “The executive branch is not asked here to simply fill in
details—it is making trade policy.”159
I will address the merits of the challenges to the delegation of trade
power in the final section of this article. Next, I will examine the potential
implications under international law should the United States be found in
violation of our trade obligations by imposing import restrictions without
justification in international law. To do that, I will examine the Essential
Security exemption found in the GATT Agreement, which closely resembles
the National Security exception found in U.S. domestic law.
ESSENTIAL SECURITY AT THEWORLD TRADEORGANIZATION
The national security exception to trade rules has been a part of the
GATT since its founding in 1947. In the original draft Charter for the GATT,
national security had been combined with other general exceptions to GATT
rules, such as preservation of health and protection of the environment.
157. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 571.
158. Tori Whiting & Riley Walters, Fixing America’s Broken Trade Laws: Section 232 of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, May 22, 2019.
159. Todd N. Tucker, New Challenge to Trump’s National Security Tariffs and Executive
Power (July 5, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-challenge-trumps-national-security
-tariffs-and-executive-power [https://perma.cc/ELR7-BUYB].
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However, the final Charter separated commercial from security exceptions,
placing national security in a subsequent article.160
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security
interests; or
(b)to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from
which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose
of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for
the maintenance of international peace and security.161
The risk that such a broad exception could pose to the sanctity of the
trade commitments made by the parties to the agreement was no doubt in the
consciousness of the drafters:
We gave a good deal of thought to the question of the security
exception which we thought should be included in the Charter. We
recognized that there was a great danger of having too wide an
exception and we could not put it into the Charter, simply by
saying: ‘by any Member of measures relating to a Member’s
security interests,’ because that would permit anything under the
sun. Therefore we thought it well to draft provisions which would
take care of real security interests and, at the same time, so far as
we could, to limit the exception so as to prevent the adoption of
protection for maintaining industries under every conceivable
circumstance. . . . there must be some latitude here for security
measures. It is really a question of balance. We have got to have
some exceptions. We cannot make it too tight, because we cannot
prohibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons.
On the other hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise
160. Article XXI Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG7/W/16 (Aug. 18,
1987) (providing an overview of the background of GATTArticle XXI as part of the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations).
161. GATT Art. XXI.
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of security, countries will put on measures which really have a
commercial purpose.162
The highly interpretive nature of this provision did not go unnoticed by
member states or commentators. There was substantial room for abuse, and
countries could easily have invoked this exception for a variety of economic
advantages that ultimately undermined the new world trade system. Good
faith was the principal basis underlying decisions not to invoke this provision
unless absolutely necessary.163 CATO Institute scholar Simon Lester has
argued that the good faith corral may be breaking down as the Trump
Administration aggressively pursues Section 232 cases on spurious national
security grounds, leaving the WTO little recourse but to either defer to his
broad interpretation, thus opening the door to similar actions by other
member states, or pass judgment on the invocation itself, going beyond what
the United States has argued the WTO should opine on and likely leading
the U.S. to distance itself from the trade body.164
The first case in which the United States invoked GATT Article XXI in
a dispute was in 1949, when Czechoslovakia filed a complaint against the
United States alleging that the latter was withholding export licenses for
certain goods from Czechoslovakia in violation of GATT rules. The United
States defended its actions on the basis of national security under Article
XXI(b)(2), to which the GATT Chairman noted, “every country must be the
judge in the last resort on questions relating to its own security.”165 This was
the only noted application of Article XXI(b)(ii), which deals with arms
trafficking. Subsequent cases relied on the more general subsection (iii).
After relations between Czechoslovakia and the United States
deteriorated during the Cold War, the United States ceased providing GATT
benefits to Czechoslovakia on the grounds of Article XXI(b)(iii), formally
dissolving their trade relationship in 1951.166 Peru followed suit a few years
later, invoking the same article to ban imports from Czechoslovakia.167
Neither of these instances led to a challenge that would have clarified the
scope of the exception.
162. U.N. SCOR, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc EPCT/A/PV/33, p. 20–21 and Corr. 3 (July 24,
1947).
163. See, e.g., Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box: The Growing Abuse of
the National Security Rationale for Restricting Trade, CATO Institute (June 25, 2019), https
://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/closing-pandoras-box-growing-abuse-national-
security-rationale [https://perma.cc/7MNG-JAEA] (discussing the Trump administration’s
abusive invocation of national security to justify tariffs).
164. Id.
165. United States Embargo on Strategic Goods, GATT Doc. CP.3/SR.22 (June 8, 1949).
166. United States – Suspension of obligations between the US and Czechoslovakia,
GATT Doc. CP.6/SR.12 (Sept. 28, 1951).
167. Prohibition of Czechoslovakian imports by Peru, GATT Doc. L/235, (Oct. 4, 1954).
372 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 23:2
A number of subsequent invocations of Article XXI were made by the
United States and other countries, though again, none resulted in a
clarification of the meaning of the Article. Two cases involving countries
other than the United States include the case of Sweden’s global import quota
system on footwear, discussed below, and a complete suspension of imports
fromArgentina into the European Economic Community (EEC), Canada and
Australia in the midst of the Falklands war.168 The Argentina case involved
extensive discussion in the GATT Council; however, the measures were
removed two months after Argentina notified the GATT of the potential
violation, thus no findings were made.
In 1985, the United States effectively embargoed all trade with
Nicaragua—imports and exports—on the basis of protecting U.S. essential
security.169 Nicaragua countered that the ban was not for security reasons
but rather for coercion. President Reagan justified the embargo on the
grounds of national security, implying that the government of Daniel Ortega
was dangerously close to the Soviet Union and supportive of communist
operations in Cuba.170 Nicaragua further argued that the invocation of Article
XXI should be clearly based upon a specific and observable threat, whereas
the United States argued that it was clearly within each sovereign state’s
power to determine what the threat is and how to respond to it. In this
instance, a panel was formed; however, the terms of reference for that panel
explicitly precluded it from examining the validity of the U.S. invocation of
Article XXI.171 The Panel report, which did not judge the use of Article XXI,
was not adopted by the parties. The embargo was removed in 1990.172
Since those initial cases, only a few instances of WTO panels exist in
which Article XXI is addressed. The 1992 breakup of Yugoslavia into
168. SeeMinisterial Declaration of 29 November 1982, GATT Doc. L/5424, at 11 (Nov.
29, 1982) (outlining how the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade plan to abide by GATT).
169. See, e.g., DanMorgan,Why the Nicaraguan Embargo?,WASH. POST, (May 5, 1985),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1985/05/05/why-the-nicaraguan-embarg
o/cce6b434-354d-41fa-a405-f06882eb6e42/ [https://perma.cc/HED9-HAJN] (comparing
previous presidential uses of a trade embargo to President Reagan’s decision to use one
against Nicaragua).
170. See, e.g., Bill Neikirk & Raymond Coffey, Reagan Puts Embargo on Nicaragua to
‘Mend Their Ways’, CHI. TRIBUNE (May 2, 1985), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-
xpm-1985-05-02-8501260877-story.html [https://perma.cc/43HY-UTPC] (explaining the
reasoning behind Reagan’s decision to impose a trade embargo against Nicaragua).
171. See Communication from the United States, Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua,
GATT Doc. L/5803 (May 9,1985) (describing an Executive Order by the United States in
placing a trade embargo on Nicaragua).
172. SeeCouncil of 3 Apr. 1990,Minutes ofMeeting, GATTDoc. C/M/240 (May 4, 1990)
(outlining the minutes of a meeting with countries bound to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade); see also Council of 3 Apr. 1990, Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, GATT
Doc. L/6661 (Mar. 23, 1990) (lifting Nicaragua’s trade embargo on the United States).
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Serbia and Montenegro occurred in the midst of trade restrictions imposed
by the United States, the European Community, and others.173 Those trade
restrictions were initially defended under Article XXI; however, because the
breakup of Yugoslavia meant that there was no certainty as to the status of
the new republics within the GATT, there could be no application of GATT
rules. Similarly, the United States imposed a complete embargo on Cuba in
1962 that was justified by Article XXI.174 Cuba notified the GATT of the
economic embargo but no action was taken at that time to form a panel.175
Complaints by various countries about the application of Article XXI
measures without following any notification procedures prompted the
Council in 1982 to debate and finally issue an interpretive decision. They
noted that the application of Article XXI could pose a serious trade
disruption and affect the benefits accruing from the GATT Agreement itself.
As such, they felt it important to require a notification provision in Article
XXI for all affected parties so that, at the very least, countries would know
when it is necessary to take action to protect their economies. The decision
made by the Contracting Parties is as follows:
1. Subject to the exception in Article XXI:a, contracting parties
should be informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures
taken under Article XXI;
2. When action is taken under Article XXI, all contracting parties
affected by such action retain their full rights under the General
Agreement; and,
3. The Council may be requested to give further consideration to
this matter in due course.176
The broad terms in which Article XXI is drafted give countries a
significant amount of power, both in terms of when a country applies the
exception and how they defend the use of the exception. In his 1998
assessment of the essential security exception, Professor Raj Bhala makes
the case that the wording of the exception grants countries near limitless
173. See Communication from European Communities, Trade Measures Taken by the
European Community Against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, GATT Doc.
L/6948 (Dec. 2, 1991) (challenging the termination of special benefits for Yugoslavia and
thus reverting them back to MFN status under GATT rules).
174. See Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 26 (Feb. 3, 1962) (issuing a trade embargo
against Cuba by the United States).
175. Committee on Industrial Products, Inventory of Non–Tariff Barriers, Specific
Limitations on Imports and Exports, GATT Doc. COM.IND/6/Add.4 (Dec. 12, 1968)
(describing national security measures the United States may take regarding trade with foreign
countries if certain threats to the nation arise).
176. SeeDecision of 30 November 1982,Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General
Agreement, GATT Doc. L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982) (considering the practical implications of
Article XXI on general trade).
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power to invoke the provision on the basis of real or perceived threats and
that their invocation cannot be challenged by affected parties nor are they
required to justify the rationale for their invocation.177 This was evident in
the 1961 case of Ghana blocking trade with newly-admitted Portugal on the
basis of a perceived threat.178 In that case, the Chairman said, “each
contracting party was the sole judge of what was necessary in its essential
security interests.” There could therefore be no objection to Ghana regarding
the boycott of goods as justified by security interests.179
Bhala suggested that GATT Article XXI enables countries to behave as
“cowboys,”180 with unfettered discretion in the application and justification
of trade restrictions based on claims of national security. The only
significant limitation in the use of this article is in the wording requiring trade
sanctions to be “necessary” for the “protection” of that country’s “essential
security interests.”181 This limitation attempts to clarify that the purpose of
Article XXI is to address national security threats—not any economic threat.
Threats to non-security sectors should be addressed by other provisions of
the GATT, such as the safeguard provisions found in Article XIX.
One example of the potential conflation between national security and
commercial threats emerged in the 1975 imposition of a global import quota
system in Sweden for certain footwear.182 Justifying the measure under
Article XXI, Sweden claimed that the
decrease in domestic production has become a critical threat to the
emergency planning of Sweden’s economic defence as an integral
part of the country’s security policy. This policy necessitates the
maintenance of a minimum domestic production capacity in vital
industries. Such a capacity is indispensable in order to secure the
provision of essential products necessary to meet basic needs in
case of war or other emergency in international relations.183
The GATT Council reviewed this measure with great skepticism and
177. See Raj Bhala National Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT Says,
and What the United States Does, 19 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263, 268–69 (1998) (discussing the broad
scope of power provided by Article XXI).
178. See GATT, Secretariat,Multilateral Trade Negotiations the Uruguay Round, GATT
Doc. MTN.GNG/NG7/W/16 (Aug. 18, 1987) (responding to a request by the negotiating
group on GATT articles to provide background on XXI).
179. Id.
180. This term was the frequent choice of Raj Bhala in his essay examining Article XXI.
Bhala, supra note 177.
181. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A–11, 55
U.N.T.S 194 [hereinafter GATT] (outlining the history and background of Article XXI and
participating countries’ obligations under GATT).
182. See Sweden – Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, GATT Doc. L/4250 (Nov.
17, 1975) (describing Sweden’s decision to institute a global quota for certain footwear).
183. Id. at 3.
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ultimately Sweden withdrew the ban in 1977.184
The World Trade Organization (WTO) came into existence on January
1, 1995, along with the GATT 1994 rules, applying largely the same essential
security exception as the previous GATT.185 The first WTO case brought
against the United States to challenge the use of Section 232 was brought by
China and six other injured countries in April 2018.186 That case raised three
complaints under the rules of the GATT, to which both China and the United
States are parties. First, they claimed that the United States is in violation of
Article II of the GATT, which binds parties to the tariff levels they
committed to under the GATT.187 By raising tariffs on steel and aluminum
without proper justification, China argues that the United States is nullifying
or impairing a benefit that they were expected to receive as a party to the
GATT.
The second claimmade by China at theWTOwas that the United States
was violating Article I of the GATT, which is the bedrock principle of Most
Favored Nation (MFN).188 MFN essentially ensures that member states to
the WTO do not provide more favorable treatment to certain countries than
they do for all member states—benefits to one member state should go to all
member states. In this case, because the United States is deliberately
applying new tariffs for steel and aluminum imports from some countries but
exempting others (namely Canada, Mexico and the EU), it is discriminating
against China and other similarly situated member states.
Finally, China makes the case that what the United States is doing, in
effect, is attempting to apply a safeguard measure, which falls under Article
XXI of GATT rules.189 However, even if the Section 232 tariffs were to be
considered a safeguard under GATT rules, the United States failed to follow
the proper procedures in investigating the nature of the threat and providing
evidence to the parties against whom the trade restriction would apply. The
United States, for its part, argues that:
184. Id. See also Council of Representatives, Report on Work Since the Thirtieth Session,
GATT Doc. L/4254 (Dec. 2, 1975) (documenting Brazil’s implementation of its import
deposit system).
185. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 86, at 669 (“Nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any contracting party from taking any action
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in
time of war or other emergency in international relations . . . .).
186. See World Trade Organization, Request for Consultations by China, U.S.—Certain
Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS/544/1 (Apr. 9, 2018)
(explaining China’s decision to adjust steel and aluminum imports to the United States).
187. See Analytical Index of GATT, Article II – Schedule of Concessions, GATT Doc.
(outlining obligations of participating countries under GATT).
188. See Analytical Index of GATT, Article I – General Most Favored Nation Treatment,
GATT Doc. (describing most favored nation treatment under GATT).
189. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 86, at 639.
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the tariffs imposed under Section 232 of the US Trade Expansion
Act were necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests given the key role steel and aluminium plays in US
national defence; these measures were therefore justified under
Article XXI of the GATT and not subject to review by a WTO
panel.190
A panel was formed to hear these claims on November 21, 2018, and a
decision is expected in fall of 2020.191
Beyond the China case, similar cases have been filed against the United
States at the WTO by India,192 the European Union, 193 Canada, 194Mexico,195
Norway,196 Russia,197 Switzerland,198 and Turkey.199 Likewise, the United
States has filed WTO complaints against China,200 Canada,201Mexico,202 the
190. SeeWTODispute Settlement, Panels Established to Review US Steel and Aluminium
Tariffs, Countermeasures on US Imports, WORLDTRADEORG. (Nov. 21, 2018) (outlining the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body’s examination of tariffs on steel and aluminium by the
United States).
191. See World Trade Organization, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminium Products, Communication from the Panel, WTO Doc. DS544 (Sept. 10, 2019)
(describing the duties of the WTO panel).
192. See World Trade Organization, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminium Products, Communication from the Panel, WTO Doc. DS547 (Sept. 10, 2019).
193. See World Trade Organization, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminium Products, Communication from the panel, WTO Doc. DS548 (Sept. 10, 2019).
194. See World Trade Organization, Communication from the Panel, United States —
Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. DS550
(July 11, 2019).
195. See World Trade Organization, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminium Products, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. DS551 (July 11, 2019).
196. See World Trade Organization, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminium Products, Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request by Norway, WTO
Doc. DS552 (Aug. 19, 2019).
197. See World Trade Organization, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminium Products, Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the Russian
Federation, WTO Doc. DS554 (Jan. 25, 2019).
198. See World Trade Organization, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminium Products, Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of Switzerland,
DS556 (May 2, 2019).
199. See World Trade Organization, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminium Products, Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of Turkey, DS564
(Aug. 19, 2019).
200. Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States, China—
Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States , WTODoc.WT/DS558/3 (Jan.
25, 2019).
201. Notification of A Mutually Agreed Solution, Canada – Additional Duties on Certain
Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS557/4 (settled on May 23, 2019).
202. Notification of A Mutually Agreed Solution,Mexico – Additional Duties on Certain
Products from the United States,WTO Doc. WT/DS560/4 (settled on May 28, 2019).
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EU203 and Turkey,204 claiming that the countermeasures taken by those
countries in response to the Section 232 tariffs were improperly applied and
should have been the result of successful WTO dispute resolution decisions
as opposed to unilateral action. Cases brought by and against Canada and
Mexico were settled in light of negotiations over the United States-Mexico-
Canada Trade Agreement that was finalized in December 2019. The
countermeasure complaints are a bit hypocritical by the United States
considering the frequent use of countermeasures by the United States in
cases of antidumping prior to authorization by the WTO.205 The United
States has defended its actions, as expected, under the Safeguards provision
of the GATT rules, Article XXI.
Most recently, the WTO dipped into the realm of interpreting national
security with the April 2019 ruling in the Russia – Traffic in Transit case.206
Ukraine filed this case with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in 2016,
claiming that Russia was violating the provisions of the GATT by blocking
Ukrainian goods transiting through Russia on their way to Kazakhstan and
the Kyrgyz Republic. Russia asserted in its defense GATT Article XXI,
claiming that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia in 2014 created an
emergency in international relations and justified the trade restriction.
Furthermore, Russia claimed that the WTO had no jurisdiction to interpret
the rationale for a member state’s invocation of Article XXI as that exception
should be “totally self-judging.”207 Interestingly, the United States joined in
supporting Russia’s defense theory.
The Panel in the Russia – Traffic in Transit case was the first to directly
assess the invocation of Article XXI. In this case, they first assessed whether
there was a national emergency, which they determined on the basis of a
number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions. They had little
trouble agreeing with Russia that a national emergency existed. The second
aspect of the review was to ensure that the measures were tied to the
mitigation of that national emergency. In this case, the Panel concluded that
it is entirely up to the member states’ discretion to determine which measures
are an appropriate response to that national emergency. Though they
emphasized the requirement of good faith in international law, an obligation
203. Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States, European
Union – Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc.
WT/DS559/3 (Jan. 25, 2019).
204. Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States, Turkey –
Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS561/3 (Jan.
25, 2019).
205. Such actions are taken pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
206. Report of the Panel, Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 26, 2019).
207. Id. at 30–31.
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that is “crystallized in demanding that the measures at issue meet a minimum
requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered essential security
interests, i.e., that they are not implausible as measures protective of these
interests.”
What is clear from this case is that the national security exception found
in Article XXI is not “self-judging.” Rather, the WTO has jurisdiction to
review these claims and to assess whether they are justified. They clarified
their interpretation of an emergency in international relations as “a situation
of armed conflict, or of latent armed conflict, or of heightened tension or
crisis, or of general instability engulfing or surrounding a state.”208 And
though they sided with Russia, which invoked the exception, they made it
clear that they would not sit on the sidelines in similar disputes. Three
additional cases have been filed on the basis of Article XXI, all brought by
Qatar against the United Arab Emirates,209 the Kingdom of Bahrain210 and
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.211 The United States is a likely target of
similar proceedings soon.
The essential security exception in the GATT rules is a tricky animal.
On the one hand, it is necessary to enable countries to protect their essential
security interests when those interests are directly affected by imported
goods. On the other hand, leaving it up to countries to define “security”
gives every member state a “get out of jail free” card when they apply this
safeguard to block trade. Some trade experts have argued that the WTO
dispute settlement system would be ineffective in resolving these matters, so
a new solution may be called for. Simon Lester of the CATO Institute, for
instance, has called for a rebalancing approach that encourages invoking
countries to exchange restrictions in certain sectors, due to national security
to be counterbalanced by new openings in other sectors to maintain the
benefits expected by the member states.212 We may perhaps have more
clarity on the appropriate application of this provision as a surge of cases
make their way through the dispute settlement system.
208. Id. at 52.
209. Report of the Panel, United Arab Emirates – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods
and Services, and Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc.
WT/DS526 (panel composed Sept. 3, 2018).
210. Report of the Panel, Bahrain – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
and Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS527 (in
consultations July 31, 2017).
211. Report of the Panel, Saudi Arabia – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and
Services, and Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS528
(in consultations July 31, 2017).
212. See Lester, supra note 163.
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RECENT TRADE ANDNATIONAL SECURITY TRENDS
The National Security Exception under the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 was last used, prior to the Trump Administration, in 1986. That case
involved metal-forming machine tools. In that instance, Commerce
concluded that the target imports did pose a threat to national security.213 The
President responded by negotiating voluntary export restraints with key
exporters of those goods in foreign markets.214 It should be noted that such
restraints were outlawed with the formation of theWorld Trade Organization
in 1995.
The ambiguity resulting from both the essential security exception
under GATT rules and the national security exception under the 1962 Trade
Expansion Act rules in the United States have created both an opportunity
and a threat for industry. Much like what happened in 1929 as the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act was being discussed, weaker domestic industries saw
potential protection against competing imports in the form of new tariffs.
Granting that protection can shield industry against economic threats but can
also harm industries that rely upon imports and would face retaliation in the
face of new tariffs, justifying import restrictions on the basis of national
security conceals the true nature of these import restrictions. In fact, they
appear to be protectionist in nature:
President Trump is increasingly blurring the line between
America’s national and economic security, enabling him to
harness powerful tools meant to punish the world’s worst global
actors and redirect them at nearly every trading partner, including
Mexico, Japan, China and Europe . . . His approach has grown
more aggressive over the past two years, culminating in an
expansive view of national security that has plunged the United
States into an economic war with nearly every trading partner.215
The precedent set in Algonquin and relied on now to justify the
President’s Section 232 tariffs may be more limited than the Administration
contends. In that opinion, Justice Marshall made it apparent that:
Our holding today is a limited one. As respondents themselves
acknowledge, a license fee as much as a quota has its initial and
direct impact on imports, albeit on their price as opposed to their
213. The President’s Statement on the Revitalization of the Machine Tool Industry, 22
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc., Dec. 16, 1986, at 1654.
214. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 15 at 4.
215. Ana Swanson & Paul Mozur, Trump Mixes Economic and National Security,
Plunging the U.S. into Multiple Fights, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/06/08/business/trump-economy-national-security.html [https://perma.cc/5FTV-ZBG
B].
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quantity . . . As a consequence, our conclusion here . . . in no way
compels the further conclusion that Any action [sic] the President
might take, as long as it has even a remote impact on imports, is
also so authorized.216
In the most recent round of national security reviews by the Department
of Commerce with respect to steel and aluminum imports, Commerce used
a broad definition of national security: “the general security and welfare of
certain industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national defense
requirements, which are critical for minimum operations of the economy and
government.”217 Despite the fact that the Court rarely limits congressional
delegations of power to the President, the Trump Administration appears to
be interpreting that delegation in such a way as to erase any intelligible
principle that might allow congress to maintain control over tariff policy.
And one thing is clear — the overarching principles of international trade
regulation rest clearly within the houses of Congress.218
A. Judicial Action: Broad Challenges to Congressional Delegation of
Trade Authority
The non-delegation doctrine holds that the Congress shall not delegate
its legislative powers, found in Article I of the U.S. Constitution, to the
President.219 Should Congress delegate its powers to the Executive, it must
provide an “intelligible principle” to guide the use of that delegated power.220
Because the power to regulate international trade is identified as a
congressional power, it shall not be delegated to the President without an
intelligible principle for utilizing it.
Challenges to the delegation of power to the President face an uphill
battle.221 Such delegations are not new, nor are the challenges to them.222
The first significant legal challenge to the delegation of congressional trade
authority took place in 1892.223 That case questioned Congress’s power to
216. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 571.
217. DEP’T OFCOM., BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF STEEL ON THE
NATIONAL SECURITY, 1 (2018).
218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
219. U.S. CONST. art. I (stating that “all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States”).
220. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
221. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non–delegation, The Inherent–Powers
Corollary, and Federal Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1393 (2017) (suggesting that
nearly every federal statute based on delegated authority withstands judicial scrutiny).
222. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down a
delegation of power under Roosevelt’s National Industrial Recovery Act related to interstate
transport of oil).
223. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
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delegate the power to unilaterally impose import tariffs in retaliation for
restrictions faced by U.S. exporters. The statute in question was the Tariff
Act of 1890, which granted duty-free access to 300 mostly agricultural
goods.224 The Act included a provision that enabled the President to suspend
the duty-free treatment of any goods from a country that imposes duties or
other restrictions on U.S. exports. According to the Act, the President
shall have the power, and it shall be his, duty to suspend, by
proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this act relating to the
free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides,
the production of such country, for such time as he shall deem
just.225
The President used the powers outlined in the Tariff Act and was met
with a challenge by U.S. importers of the goods facing increased tariffs.
Petitioners claimed that Congress had unlawfully delegated both legislative
and treaty-making powers to the President.226 However, the Supreme Court
determined that, while it is true that Congress may not delegate legislative
power to the President, this Act was not in any way giving the President the
power to legislate. When the President used the power in the Act to suspend
duty-free access, the imports were taxed at the former rate established by
Congress, not at a new rate set by the President.227 The Court upheld the Act
as a valid delegation of Congressional power to the President.228
A similar case emerged in 1928 to challenge the delegation of
Congressional authority found in the Tariff Act of 1922.229 In that Act,
Congress stipulated:
[W]henever the President, upon investigation of the differences in
costs of production of articles wholly or in part the growth or
product of the United States and of like or similar articles wholly
or in part the growth or product of competing foreign countries,
shall find it thereby shown that the duties fixed in this act do not
equalize the said differences in costs of production in the United
States and the principal competing country he shall, by such
investigation, ascertain said differences and determine and
proclaim the changes in classifications or increases or decreases in
any rate of duty provided in this act shown by said ascertained
differences in such costs of production necessary to equalize the
224. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567.
225. Id. at 612.
226. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. at 681.
227. Id. at 693.
228. Id.
229. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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same.230
When importers challenged the constitutionality of this section of the
Act, the U.S. Supreme Court again upheld the delegation as a valid exercise
of Congressional power since it did not pass off legislative power to the
President. The principles set forth in this case are particularly relevant today,
as they are the same used in the Algonquin case discussed earlier. It is worth
quoting in its entirety here:
If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates
is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power. If it is thought wise to vary the
customs duties according to changing conditions of production at
home and abroad, it may authorize the Chief Executive to carry
out this purpose, with the advisory assistance of a Tariff
Commission appointed under congressional authority.231
This intelligible principle test enables Congress to designate the
President as their agent in carrying out their trade goals.232
In the midst of the Lochner era, the U.S. Supreme Court was not
particularly sympathetic to delegations of legislative trade power to the
Executive. Two cases highlight this point. The first was based on objections
to the congressional delegation of power made by the 1933 National
Industrial Recovery Act in the midst of the Great Depression.233 That Act
enabled President Roosevelt to issue rules that promoted fair competition,
labor rights, and public works.234 Roosevelt enacted Executive Order 6199
on the basis of that authority, which restricted the transport of oil across state
borders. An oil refinery—Panama Refining Co.—challenged the delegation
as unlawful, and the U.S. Supreme Court in an 8-1 decision agreed that
Congress had not provided any structure within which the President could
utilize the delegated authority.235
230. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 941 (1922).
231. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 404.
232. CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44707, PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY OVER TRADE: IMPOSING TARIFFS AND DUTIES 11–12 (2016) (“As is evident from
these cases, a delegation by Congress will likely be upheld as constitutional so long as the
statute allows the President to act as the “agent” of the legislative department, rather than play
a law-making role.”).
233. Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1933) (“If § 9 (c) [of the National Industrial
Recovery Act] were held valid . . . . Instead of performing its law-making function, the
Congress could at will and as to such subjects as it chose transfer that function to the
President.”).
234. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73–67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
235. Justice Benjamin Cardozo was the sole dissenting justice. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S.,
433.
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The second case was a unanimous ruling by the Supreme Court in a
case involving the sale of sick chickens.236 Again under the National
Industrial Recovery Act, Congress delegated authority to the President to
develop codes of conduct for businesses, which would be written by business
groups and boards within those industries. The regulatory power was
derived from the Commerce Clause, the root of many expansive federal
regulatory efforts in this historical period. But the relevant legal question for
our purposes is whether Congress appropriately delegated its legislative
power to the President to enact codes of conduct, to which the Court
resoundingly affirmed that it did not.
The intelligible principlewas discussed with respect to trade in the 1975
Yoshida International case.237 In that case, which is more directly aligned to
our examination here, the President declared a national emergency and
imposed import duties on Japanese goods under the authority of the Trading
with the Enemy Act of 1917. The Court made it abundantly clear that it
would not question the judgment of the President about the nature of the
national emergency — this would be considered a political question outside
the court’s purview. However, it retained the authority to question what he
did with that power. “A standard inherently applicable to the exercise of
delegated emergency powers is the extent to which the action taken bears a
reasonable relation to the power delegated and to the emergency giving rise
to the action.”238
What we can conclude from this series of key cases is the following:
1. the Congress has wide latitude in delegating its trade power to
the President so long as it does so with intelligible guidelines for
his action;
2. if the President declares a national emergency under a statute
that delegates trade power, the President’s use of any such
delegated power must be reasonably related the national
emergency; and,
3. the Courts will not review the President’s rationale for
declaring a national emergency but will review his use of trade
power under the invoked national emergency statute.
A recent case, which is still pending as of the publication of this article,
challenges the delegation of power both on lack of national security grounds
and on Fifth Amendment Due Process grounds, claiming that the President
236. SeeA. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935) (“Of
the six counts, one charged the sale to a butcher of an unfit chicken. . . .”).
237. See United States v. Yoshida Int’l Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 579 (C.C.P.A. 1975)
(discussing a surcharge put in place to help regain a “favorable balance of trade” that had been
lost by the United States).
238. Id. at 578.
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is arbitrarily discriminating against importers.239 That case has not yet been
decided but raises an interesting new front in challenges to the delegation of
congressional power.
B. Judicial Action: Narrow Challenges to Section 232
“Though courts will not normally review the essentially political
questions surrounding the declaration or continuance of a national
emergency, they will not hesitate to review the actions taken in response
thereto or in reliance thereon.”240
Several legal challenges have emerged in an effort to restrict the power
of the Executive to apply the national security exception with impunity. One
of the first cases challenging this application of power was brought by the
U.S. subsidiary of a Russian oil producer, Severstal Export Gmbh. That
2018 case asserted that the President had acted outside of his delegated
congressional authority by applying tariffs on steel imports despite there
being no national security threat. The injunction sought by petitioners was
dismissed by the CIT on a finding that the petitioners would be unlikely to
prevail on the merits of the case.241
The first case to come to fruition in a challenge to the present use of
Section 232 was brought by a trade association in June 2018.242 The
petitioners in that case, representing the American international steel
industry, argued that “Congress created an unconstitutional regime in section
232, in which there are essentially no limits or guidelines on the trigger or
the remedies available to the President, and no alternative protections to
assure that the President stays within the law, instead of making the law
himself.”243 They did not argue that there was any violation of procedure in
investigating and applying the import restrictions; rather, their main concern
was the alleged violation of the nondelegation doctrine and the resulting
239. Complaint at 1–3, MedTrade Inc. v. United States, No.19–00009 (Ct. Int’l Trade filed
Jan. 17, 2019).
240. Yoshida, 526 F.2d at 579.
241. See Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5–9, Severstal Export
GMBH v. United States, No. 18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298 (Ct. of Int’l Trade April 5, 2018)
(No. 18–00057) (“The degree of potential harm is thus insufficient to overcome plaintiffs’
low likelihood of success on the merits. . . . Therefore, a preliminary injunction will not
issue.”).
242. Complaint at 1–2, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F.Supp. 3d
1335(Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (No. 18–00152), aff’d 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6106 (Fed. Cir.,
Feb. 28, 2020), cert. denied, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1079 (2020).
243. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3–4, Am.
Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F.Supp. 3d 1335 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (No. 18–
00152), aff’d 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6106 (Fed. Cir., Feb. 28, 2020), cert. denied, 207 L. Ed.
2d 1079 (2020).
2021] NATIONAL SECURITY TARIFFS 385
injury to their industry.244
The CIT held in March 2019 that the President was acting within his
lawfully delegated powers. They relied upon the Algonquin decision to
justify their decision, finding that congress had established an “intelligible
principle” to guide presidential action when they delegated this power
through Section 232.245 It is worth noting that one of the judges in that CIT
decision, Judge Katzmann, wrote separately to question the validity of such
a broad delegation of congressional power.246
That decision was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which issued its decision in February 2020, upholding the decision
of the lower court.247 In their decision, a unanimous Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit agreed with the conclusions of the CIT, finding that the
congressional delegation of power to restrict imports in the interest of
national security was a proper delegation of power to the President, and that
the delegation in this case included an intelligible principle to limit abuse of
that delegation.248
The ruling of the CAFC was quite clear, rejecting the broad claim that
Section 232 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
executive. They emphasized that their ruling is based upon the binding
precedent set forth in the Algonquin case, and they make no judgment on
what the ruling would be should that precedent be overturned.249 The
petitioner appealed their case to the U.S. Supreme Court, and that Court
denied cert in June 2020.250
C. Congressional Action
Two pieces of legislation were proposed in late 2019 in an effort to
reign in the President’s section 232 powers. The first, a bill by Senator Pat
Toomey, a Republican from Pennsylvania, aims to reassert congressional
244. See Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6106, at
*11–13 (Fed. Cir., Feb. 28, 2020) (“AIIS stated a single claim: that section 232, on its face, is
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President.”), cert. denied, 207 L.
Ed.2d 1079 (2020).
245. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 15, at 37.
246. See Am. Inst. For Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 18–00152, slip op. at 15–16
(Katzmann, J., dubitante) (“There is no provision in the Constitution that vests in the President
the same ‘Power To Lay and collect . . . Duties.’ In short, the power to impose duties is a
core legislative function.”).
247. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6106, cert. denied, 207 L. Ed.
2d 1079 (2020).
248. See Id. at *13 (relying on Algonquin as controlling authority).
249. Id.
250. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel Inc., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6106, cert. denied 207 L. Ed. 2d
1079 (2020).
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power over the regulation of commerce, including the use of tariffs. Toomey
notes that “the Constitution is very unambiguous” about where trade power
is housed: Article I, within the bounds of the legislature. The second
proposed bill was proffered by Senator Rob Portman of Ohio, another
Republican facing criticism from farmers and others hurt by the
Administration’s tariffs. Senator Portman’s bill only enables congress to
disapprove of the President’s use of 232 powers, while providing him with a
veto power over that disapproval. Portman emphasized, “We must be able
to hold countries that threaten our national security accountable” while
preventing abuse of the tool.251 Neither of these bills are expected to pass.
THE FUTURE OFCONGRESSIONAL TRADEDELEGATION TO THE
EXECUTIVE
As of this writing, several Section 232 investigations remain pending,
including the potentially very significant investigation into automobiles and
automobile parts.252 The future of these investigations depends largely on
the post-hoc review of the federal courts rather than on the findings of
Commerce, which tend to take a defensive posture in the current political
environment. Whether the President acts on those recommendations is
another question that largely depends on the anticipated impact on the
economy from more tariffs.
The more interesting question is whether Congress will take a more
assertive role with respect to the delegation of trade power to the Executive.
As I have explained above, the power to regulate international trade clearly
rests with the Congress. And though it can be argued that trade policy power
may be exercised by the President in the context of foreign affairs
negotiations, such as in levying trade sanctions to encourage specific
behaviors,253 the power to impose import restrictions or reductions is
certainly a congressional power, though one that has been delegated
repeatedly to the President since 1934. However, as I have tried to make
apparent in this article, that power has always been in limited contexts and
almost always in the pursuit of more open trade, rather than less.
The national security exception inserted into the 1955 Trade Agreement
251. Lindsay Wise, Lawmakers Make Long–Shot Bid to Check Presidential Tariffs
Powers,WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2019, 3:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-ma
ke-long-shot-bid-to-check-presidential-tariff-powers-11568571897?mod=searchresults&pag
e=1&pos=1 [https://perma.cc/WTU9-UPS8].
252. See RACHEL F. FEFER, BILL CANIS & BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IF10971 SECTION 232 AUTO INVESTIGATION (2020) (discussing the “potential economic
impact” of tariffs on auto parts and the issues that remain for Congress going forward).
253. See, e.g., Fandl, supra note 103, at 295 (arguing in support of Executive power to
terminate an economic embargo related to foreign policy goals).
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Extension Act and codified in subsequent legislation reflected the fear of the
American people and their congressional representatives that Soviet
economic power might compromise our ability to maintain our advantage
should the Cold War develop into a direct military conflict. At that time, it
seemed appropriate to endow the President with the power to fend off this
threat with as many tools as possible, including the ability to restrict trade.
The Act purports to pursue the following three goals: 1) stimulate economic
growth in the United States and enlarge foreign markets for U.S. goods; 2)
strengthen relationships with foreign countries in the “free world,” and; 3)
“prevent Communist economic penetration.”254
Section 232 is the focus of the current tariffs, but it must be read in both
historical context and also in light of the prior section of that statute. Section
231 requires the President to suspend or withdraw from any trade agreement
that provides any duty-free or tariff reductions applied to any country or area
“dominated . . . by Communism.”255 The fact that Section 232 was not
modified by the 1962 Act reflected the continued concern over the
communist economic threat.256
The original national security provision, which was part of the 1955
Trade Agreements Extension Act, is often ignored in the literature
surrounding Section 232 because it was considered vague and incomplete.
However, it is worthwhile examining briefly the rationale for the insertion
and the debate surrounding the addition of this broad new power. Indeed,
with great foresight, the U.S. Council to the International Chamber of
Commerce commented in 1955 that “it is unlikely that the full meaning of
this amendment will be clear until a history of administrative practice and
possibly court interpretation develops.”257 In commentary following the
delegation, the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee
observed:
In arriving at his decision [the President] must consider the impact
of that decision on our total foreign policy, and on the economies
of the nations of the free world that are aligned with us. He must
also consider the impact of any decision on our overall strength
and security, keeping in mind that any modification of a duty on
imports or that a quota would inevitably result in a curtailment of
254. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 102, 76 Stat. 872, 872.
255. Id. § 231.
256. See, e.g., Stanley D. Metzger, The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 51 Geo. L.J. 425,
463 (1963) (explaining why no changes were made to the National Security exception).
257. DAVID W. MACEACHRON, U.S. COUNCIL OF THE INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
ANALYSIS OF THE TRADEAGREEMENTS EXTENSIONACT OF 1955, at 8 (1955) https://babel.hat
hitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112101127670&view=1up&seq=4 [https://perma.cc/WYE4-U3
E6].
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exports by the United States.258
The U.S. Council recognized that this grant of power was far more
sweeping than the original delegation in 1934,259 and they stated that both
advocates of free trade and protectionism could interpret the National
Security clause in their interests.260 In effect, the National Security provision
could be used for political rather than either economic or security purposes.
Congress reasserted some of its authority over trade in the 1962 Trade
Expansion Act, when it required the President to solicit Congressional
approval before any trade agreement would be approved; this was not
required under the 1934 RTAA.261 This was modified by the 1974 Trade
Act, which enabled the President to enter into trade agreements on the basis
of an up or down vote by Congress in what was known as “fast track
authority.”262 This authority, referred to today as “Trade Promotion
Authority,”263 requires pre-authorization by Congress, which has been in
effect through a series of extensions almost consistently through the last
authorization in 2015.264 That reauthorization extends TPA through 2021.
It is imperative that these protections not be abused in an effort to
facilitate protectionist fervor, favoring special interests at the expense of
broad economic growth. The U.S. Congress is a body of 535 voices, each
with very different interests with respect to trade. In retrospect, the founding
fathers might have reconsidered the designation of trade authority within
Article I of the Constitution. It is largely for this reason that Congress
designated the President, who has responsibility for foreign affairs, to
implement the legislative vision for trade policy and, where necessary, to
adopt that vision to the circumstances of the global environment. However,
in none of the aforementioned statutes does Congress willingly cede its
258. Id. (emphasis added).
259. Id. (“The loose language of this amendment confers upon the President more
sweeping power over the foreign trade of this country than is granted by the original
provisions of the Trade Agreements Act.”).
260. Id. (“The phrase ‘the national security’ has many meanings and has been used freely
by both advocates and opponents of a liberalized trade program.”).
261. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872.
262. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 151-154, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001-08
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2194) (describing the brief approving or disapproving
resolutions Congress can give, as well as how amendments and debate time are limited, and
that there is a window of time in which the vote must occur for trade agreement proposals).
263. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2101, 116 Stat. 993, 993 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 3801) (explaining that the title may be referred to as the “Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2002”).
264. See Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub.
L. No. 114-26, § 103, 129 Stat. 320, 333–37 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4202) (discussing how
the President may enter trade agreements through 2018 based on this act, and through July 1,
2021 if “trade authorities procedures are extended . . .”).
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power over trade policy. Each Act includes a clear mandate with goals and
mechanisms meant to achieve those goals. The fact that the President is
tasked with carrying out those goals should not be mistaken for a wholesale
shift in policymaking power.
The world in 1955 is obviously quite distinct from the world of 2019,
in terms of both trade and national security. We currently operate within a
world trade system that has evolved tremendously, whereby countries have
bound themselves and their economic progress to the fate of one another
within a world trade system. The rules of that system provide safeguards,
including national security, that enable countries to pursue their trade
objectives freely while maintaining carefully crafted exemptions to be called
upon in limited circumstances, as seen in the Russia case described above.
Yet none of this provides clarity on what lies ahead.
History has shown that, though congressional delegation of power to
the President is criticized, the judicial branch gives broad discretion for such
delegations to occur.265 The precedent in Algonquin emphasizes the degree
of discretion the Court is willing to give to the Executive, and the recent
decision in American Institute for International Steel confirms this
assumption. However, this outcome should not be surprising and is
avoidable. It is not the role of the Court to develop and implement trade
policy. This is the role of the Congress, and it is a role that has largely been
shirked since 1934. Since the eighteenth century, Congress has balanced the
diverse needs of domestic industries and agriculture with the pursuit of
international trade, and the President has enforced these policies. Today,
Congress must reassert this policymaking power and work together with the
President to determine the optimal outcome of effective trade policies that
benefit the United States as a whole rather than special interests. Much like
domestic tax policy, which Congress works hand in glove with the Executive
to enact, the two branches must determine what kind of a country the United
States intends to be: the narrowly-focused protectionist harbor it was in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or the beacon of free and fair trade
that it became. This is not a question for one man alone to answer.
265. SeeKeith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Non–delegation Doctrine,
165U. PA. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (2017) (introducing the argument that courts have never gone
through any period in which “legislative delegations of power” were limited by the
nondelegation doctrine).
